APT5
Also known as KEYHOLE PANDA, MANGANESE, BRONZE FLEETWOOD, TEMP.Bottle, Mulberry Typhoon, Poisoned Flight, BASALT CASTLE, UNC2630
We have observed one APT group, which we call APT5, particularly focused on telecommunications and technology companies. More than half of the organizations we have observed being targeted or breached by APT5 operate in these sectors. Several times, APT5 has targeted organizations and personnel based in Southeast Asia. APT5 has been active since at least 2007. It appears to be a large threat group that consists of several subgroups, often with distinct tactics and infrastructure. APT5 has targeted or breached organizations across multiple industries, but its focus appears to be on telecommunications and technology companies, especially information about satellite communications. APT5 targeted the network of an electronics firm that sells products for both industrial and military applications. The group subsequently stole communications related to the firm’s business relationship with a national military, including inventories and memoranda about specific products they provided. In one case in late 2014, APT5 breached the network of an international telecommunications company. The group used malware with keylogging capabilities to monitor the computer of an executive who manages the company’s relationships with other telecommunications companies
CVEs in recent coverage
No CVEs named alongside this actor in the last 90 days.
Recent victims
No leak-site posts on record for this group.
ATT&CK techniques
Recent activity
No posts or advisories have named this actor recently.
References
- https://www.fireeye.com/current-threats/apt-groups.html
- https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-southeast-asia-threat-landscape.pdf
- https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/bronze-fleetwood
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/insights/apt-groups
- https://query.prod.cms.rt.microsoft.com/cms/api/am/binary/RWMFIi
- http://internal-www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/04/suspected-apt-actors-leverage-bypass-techniques-pulse-secure-zero-day.html
- https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/updated-cyber-threat-actor-naming-system/
- https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1023
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/intelligence/microsoft-threat-actor-naming?view=o365-worldwide
- https://media.defense.gov/2022/Dec/13/2003131586/-1/-1/0/CSA-APT5-CITRIXADC-V1.PDF
- https://query.prod.cms.rt.microsoft.com/cms/api/am/binary/RW1aFyW
- https://web.archive.org/web/20220122121143/https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-southeast-asia-threat-landscape.pdf
From the MISP threat-actor galaxy, MITRE ATT&CK and RansomLook (CC BY 4.0). Activity is any post or advisory Watch Floor collected that names the actor or one of its aliases.